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CoRPORATIONs-ZoNING-Rl:GHT 011 GRANTEE TO Aar oN VARIIssuED TO Hts GRANToR-A zoning ordinance prohibited the erection of
private garages within twenty feet of the street line. Because of the peculiar shape
of the lot in question, a variance was granted to the then owner permitting the
building of a garage closer to the street line. However, before the garage was built,
the land was sold to the present owner who obtained a building permit and began
construction.. Plaintiffs, owners of the adjoining lot, objected to the granting of
the permit and appealed to the zoning board of review which denied their appeal.
On certiorari, held, present owner might act on the variance granted to his predecessor. Mastrati v. Strauss, (R.1. 1949) 67 A. (2d) 29.
The validity of comprehensive zoning ordinances, including the imposition
of set-back lines, is no longer open to question.1 Similarly, the delegation of power
to a zoning board of appeals to grant variances from the terms of the ordinance is
generally approved.2 The novel question presented by the instant case is whether
or not the benefits of a variance pass with a grant of the land, or whether the
variance is merely a personal privilege which expires with non-user. It would
seem that a variance is not a personal privilege. For instance, once a variance has
been acted upon, a grantee of the land can continue to use it in the manner permitted by the variance.3 Similarly, where an existing non-conforming use has been
excepted from the operation of the zoning ordinance, a grantee of the land is
permitted to continue the use.4 It has even been held that a variance which is
restricted to the present owner is invalid for that reason.5 The zoning restrictions,
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1 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114 (1926). The
courts of at least thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia have upheld zoning regulations as a proper exercise of the police power. Specific provisions concerning set-back lines
have also been usually upheld. Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 47 S.Ct. 675 (1927). However, a set-back line based on the location of a percentage of buildings on the block is invalid.
Appeal of White, 287 Pa. 259, 134 A. 409 (1926).
2 Where the authority of the board to grant a variance is denied, it is usually because
the provisions of the ordinance did not furnish adequate standards for the board and were
therefore an unlawful delegation of legislative power. Welton v. Hamilton, 344 ID. 82, 176
N.E. 333 (1931); Lewis v. Mayor, 164 Md. 146, 164 A. 220 (1933).
3 The converse is also true: without a change in other facts, the board can not grant a
variance to the present owner after it had previously refused to grant a variance to his predecessor. McGarry v. Walsh, 213 App. Div. 289, 210 N.Y.S. 286 (1925).
4 BASSETI', ZONING 105 (1940).
5 Olevson v. Zoning Board of Review of Town of Narragansett, 71 R.I. 303, 44 A. (2d)
720 (1948).
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however, do not constitute a "taking" of property for public use so as to violat~
the due process clause of state or federal constitutions or to require the payment
of compensation.6 Nor does the imposition of a zoning restriction give the public
an interest in the nature of an easement which will constitute an encumbrance on
the land.7 Therefore, if the city takes nothing by imposing the restriction, it grants
nothing when the board issues a variance. The board merely removes the prior
limitation of a property right. The process may be described as follows: when an
ordinance is passed restricting the distance from the street line within which a
landowner may build a garage, it limits one of his property rights, the right to
build a garage on his own land wherever he pleases. When a variance is issued,
the effect is to remove the limitation: the owner's rights in the particular land are
the same as if the ordinance had never been passed. Under such an analysis, a
deed of the land, carrying with it all of the property rights of the grantor, would
carry with it the now unlimited right to build a garage closer to the street line
8
than was permitted by the zoning ordinance.
\
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6 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., supra, note I. Zoning ordinances are not an
exercise of the power of eminent domain. State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 196
N.W. 451 (1923); Ware v. City of Wichita, 113 Kan. 153, 214 P. 99 (1923).
7 Kend v. Crestwood Realty Co., 210 Wis. 239,246 N.W. 311 (1933).
8 The court in the instant case reserves the question as to whether a grantee might act
upon a variance given to his predecessor in case there had been a substantial change in the
nature of the neighborhood or land between the time the variance was issued and the time
the grantee acquired the land. However, if these were the facts, the proper action of the
adjoining landowners would be an attempt to have the original variance set aside. See
BASSBTr, ZONING 115 (1940).

